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INTRODUCTION
There is near-universal agreement that the engine of the modern
American criminal justice system is plea bargaining.1 Given the
ubiquity of plea bargaining, the Supreme Court and the rest of the
legal community have begun setting their sights on how the prac-
tice might be better regulated.2 At the same time, many hold the
view that the grand jury has outlived its usefulness in the adminis-
tration of criminal justice and is a relic of a time gone by.3 Even
before recent calls for the abolition of the grand jury in the wake of
high-profile cases that seemed to cast the institution in a bad light,4
serious questions arose regarding the necessity of a body that
seemed superfluous in an era in which most criminal cases end in
guilty pleas.5
This Article, written for the William & Mary Law Review Sympo-
sium, Plea Bargaining Regulation: The Next Criminal Procedure
Frontier, considers how plea bargaining might be better regulated
and whether the grand jury could play a role in the regulation of
plea bargainingnamely, in the determination of the factual basis
for pre-indictment guilty pleas and the reasonableness, fairness,
1. See, e.g., Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012); George Fisher, Plea Bargain-
ings Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 859 (2000).
2. See, e.g., Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388; Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407-08 (2012);
Jenny Roberts, Effective Plea Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2650, 2665-69 (2013).
3. See Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused,
80 CORNELL L. REV. 260, 261, 263 (1995).
4. See, e.g., LaDoris Hazzard Cordell, Grand Juries Should Be Abolished, SLATE (Dec.
9, 2014, 8:13 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/12/
abolish_grand_juries_justice_for_eric_garner_and_michael_brown.html [https://perma.cc/Z4
8Y-JK6K]; George E. Curry, U.S. Should Abolish Grand Jury System, PHILA. TRIB. (Dec. 10,
2014,4:42 PM), http://www.phillytrib.com/commentary/u-s-should-abolish-grand-jury-system/
article_f5fe10e1-ca23-5adb-a9cc-4d0cdeee4423.html [https://perma.cc/WAF5-DKUL]; James
C. Harrington, Abolish Grand Jury System, SAN ANTONIOEXPRESS-NEWS (Dec. 21, 2014, 12:00
AM), http://www.mysanantonio.com/opinion/commentary/article/Abolish-grand-jury-system-
5969702.php [https://perma.cc/2X2U-J4BZ]; Caleb Pilgrim, Lets Abolish the Grand Jury Sys-
tem, NEW HAVEN REG. (Dec. 9, 2014, 2:17 PM), http://www.nhregister.com/opinion/20141209/
caleb-pilgrim-lets-abolish-the-grand-jury-system [https://perma.cc/SU9R-XTUC].
5. See, e.g., William J. Campbell, Eliminate the Grand Jury, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY 174, 174 (1973); Phyllis L. Crocker, Appointed but (Nearly) Prevented from Serving: My
Experiences as a Grand Jury Foreperson, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 289, 290 (2004); Niki Kuckes,
The Useful, Dangerous Fiction of Grand Jury Independence, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 2 (2004);
Leipold, supra note 3, at 261, 263.
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and propriety of plea bargains and plea agreements. In this way, the
Article evaluates whether the grand jury may serve as a popular ac-
countability mechanism for defense counsel, prosecutors, and judges
in the guilty plea process.
Part I of this Article examines the recent recognition of the in-
fluence and ubiquity of plea bargaining in modern criminal justice
and the procedural and substantive safeguards courts have begun
to impose in order to regulate the guilty plea process. This Part
highlights the lack of popular participation in this world of guilty
pleas, and calls for ways to maintain the lay role in the disposition
of criminal cases.6
Part II of this Article proposes a thought experiment. What if we
deployed the grand jury in the guilty plea process? Could the sup-
posedly underutilized grand jury provide the vehicle desired for
regulation of the plea bargaining regime and inject the popular par-
ticipation missing in todays criminal justice system? In particular,
might the grand jury have a role to play when the court determines
whether there is a factual basis for the guilty plea and reviews the
terms of the plea agreement? Part III recognizes the significant
practical challenges to the use of the grand jury for these purposes
and considers practical and philosophical objections to this pro-
posalparticularly those raised by a number of thoughtful and
prominent trial judges interviewed by the author. The Article con-
cludes with thoughts on what these judges believe are the most
pressing needs for reform in the plea bargaining regime and which
solutions are most compelling.
I. THE WORLD OF GUILTY PLEAS AND THE CALL FOR RESTORING
POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Today, nearly all convictions come after the defendant pleads
guilty to the charges alleged against him.7 Indeed, in Lafler v.
6. See Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancement in a World
of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1100 (2001).
7. See, e.g., SEAN ROSENMERKEL ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT OF
JUSTICE [DOJ], NCJ 226846,FELONYSENTENCES IN STATECOURTS,2006STATISTICAL TABLES
24, 25 tbl.4.1 (2010), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf [https://perma.cc/7R4Y-
2ZLD]; U.S. SENTENCING COMMN, 2012 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS
fig.C (2012), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-
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Cooper, the Supreme Court recently recognized the centrality and
ubiquity of plea bargaining in the modern criminal justice system:
[C]riminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas,
not a system of trials. Ninety-seven percent of federal convic-
tions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result
of guilty pleas.... [T]he right to adequate assistance of counsel
cannot be defined or enforced without taking account of the cen-
tral role plea bargaining plays in securing convictions and
determining sentences.8
This means that there is little, if any, popular participation in the
modern criminal justice system. Of course, democratically elected
representatives are responsible for passing the criminal laws, and
prosecutorsmost of whom are elected and thus presumably ac-
countable to the electorateare charged with enforcing the laws.9
However, the sort of direct lay involvement in the adjudication of
criminal cases contemplated by the founding generation has given
way to administrative efficiency in this world of guilty pleas.10
The fact that nearly all criminal convictions are derived from
guilty pleas rather than trials has fueled the sentiment that the
community needs more involvement in the determination of crim-
inal cases.11 One thoughtful proposal, advanced by Professor Laura
Appleman, would create a plea jury to help guide the guilty plea
process and provide the court with lay perspective in the consi-
deration and processing of guilty pleas.12 As Professor Appleman
explains:
[T]he current configuration of the criminal guilty plea leaves no
room for the communitys voice. Guilty pleas, although indispen-
sable to the smooth processing of criminal justice, have become
hasty and rote, allowing little to no expression of the commu-
nitys voice. Moreover, the chronic imbalance of prosecutorial
power over the last thirty years has shrunk the roles of the
reports-and-sourcebooks/2012/FigureC.pdf [https://perma.cc/92QP-T457].
8. 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012) (citations omitted).
9. See Roger A.Fairfax, Jr., Prosecutorial Nullification,52 B.C.L.REV. 1243, 1268 (2011).
10. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971); Bibas, supra note 6, at
1150.
11. See Laura I. Appleman, The Plea Jury, 85 IND. L.J. 731, 732 (2010).
12. Id. at 733-34.
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defendant, the defense attorney, and even the court to small
ones that are easily pushed aside.
Incorporating a plea jury into the guilty-plea process provides
the solution to many of these problems.13
Therefore, Professor Appleman proposes the creation of a jury ex-
pressly for the purpose of reviewing plea bargains and the plea
process.14 This plea jury, which Professor Appleman describes as
a cross between a grand jury and a petit jury,15 would supplement
or usurp the judge in the core functions the court performs in the
plea process, determining that: (1) the plea is knowing, voluntary,
and intelligent; (2) a factual basis exists for the plea; and (3) the
sentence is appropriate.16
II. THOUGHT EXPERIMENT: USING THE GRAND JURY IN THE GUILTY
PLEA PROCESS
In addition to enhancing the guilty plea process that animates the
bulk of criminal justice today, Professor Applemans proposal pro-
motes lay participation in the criminal justice system. However,
the creation of such a plea jury might, in fact, be unnecessary. As
the author of this Article has posited elsewhere, a new entity or
mechanism for popular participation in the plea process may be su-
perfluous.17 The grand jury might be in a position to play the role
contemplated by the proposed plea jury.18
However, the suggestion that the grand jury is already equipped
to perform this function has not been adequately fleshed outuntil
now. Although the grand jury may not be the best arbiter of whether
a plea is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent,19 the grand jury could
13. Id. (foonote omitted).
14. Id. at 734.
15. Id. at 748.
16. Id.
17. See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Grand Jury Innovation: Toward a Functional Makeover of
the Ancient Bulwark of Liberty, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 339, 357 (2010).
18. See id.
19. The legal determination of plea voluntariness safeguards different Sixth Amendment
interests of the defendant and is properly allocated to the court. See United States v. Vonn,
535 U.S. 55, 62 (2002); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-44 (1969); Ronald F. Wright,
Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79,
92-93 (2005).
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play a key role in determining whether there is a factual basis for
a guilty plea and whether the plea agreement is fair and proper.
What follows is an outside of the box idea that considers whether
the grand jury could have a role to play in the regulation of plea
bargainingnamely, in the determination of the factual basis for
pre-indictment guilty pleas and the reasonableness, fairness, and
propriety of plea agreements.
A. Factual Basis
Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the judge pre-
siding over a guilty plea must determine that there is a factual basis
for the plea.20 Given the grand jurys unique features, it might be an
excellent organ for the review of the factual basis. First, this is what
the grand jury does. One of its core functions is to determine wheth-
er there is a sufficient factual basisprobable causeto believe that
the target of the grand jurys inquiry committed the alleged of-
fense.21 In doing so, the grand jurors have the opportunity to engage
in a full and frank discussion of the facts placed before them, and
they can deliberate to reach a conclusion as to whether there is, in
fact, probable cause to support the indictment.22 This process can be
easily adapted for determining whether there is a factual basis for
the guilty plea.
Second, this function can be performed because of what the grand
jury is. Because of its typically larger size, the grand jury represents
a greater cross-section of the community than the petit jury.23 It is
therefore uniquely equipped to bring to bear the diverse views and
experiences of the grand jurors as they assess whether the facts al-
leged by the government and admitted by the defendant are indeed
substantiated.24
Although it may seem odd to require a third party to approve
facts stipulated by both the government and the defendant, this is
20. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3).
21. See Niki Kuckes, The Democratic Prosecutor: Explaining the Constitutional Function
of the Federal Grand Jury, 94 GEO. L.J. 1265, 1268-69 (2006).
22. See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Grand Jury Discretion and Constitutional Design, 93 COR-
NELL L. REV. 703, 744-45 (2008).
23. See id. at 745.
24. See id.
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exactly what federal courts now are tasked with doing under Rule
11.25 Particularly in light of the debate over whether it is proper for
a court to acceptor for defense counsel to acquiesce ina guilty
plea made by an individual who is factually innocent,26 the grand
jury could provide a useful community perspective on the important
question of whether someone who is not clearly culpable should be
permitted to plead guilty to an offense.
B. Approval of the Plea Agreement
Federal judges presiding over guilty pleas must also decide
whether to accept the plea bargain itself.27 Although federal judges
are prohibited from becoming involved in plea discussions,28 the
reviewing court must consider the terms of the plea bargain.29 Given
the need to assess plea agreements and the general lack of popular
involvement in criminal cases involving guilty pleas, the grand jury
could play an important role. If one of the central concerns is wheth-
er the plea bargain is in the public interest, who better than a cross-
section of the public to weigh in on the matter? Grand jurors could
highlight aspects of the bargain that do not comport with commu-
nity values.
Furthermore, having the grand jury play this role could do more
than ferret out improper plea bargains that already have been
struck; the knowledge that a grand jury might review the terms of
a plea agreement might discourage prosecutorial unfairness. First,
prosecutors would have an additional incentive to treat similarly-
situated defendants similarly, thus promoting fairness for individ-
ual defendants. Second, grand jury review might help ensure that
the terms of a plea agreement are not too lenient or too harsh rela-
tive to community preferences and norms.
25. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3).
26. See, e.g., Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1119 (2008);
Lucian E. Dervan & Vanessa A. Edkins, The Innocent Defendants Dilemma: An Innovative
Empirical Study of Plea Bargainings Innocence Problem, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1,
17-18 (2013).
27. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3).
28. See id. 11(c)(1); United States v. Davila, 133 S. Ct. 2139, 2146 (2013).
29. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)-(5).
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C. Challenges and Objections
1. The Grand Jurys Usefulness
Ultimately, deploying the grand jury in the plea process has the
potential not only to improve the main avenue for the disposition of
criminal cases but also to help restore popular participation in crim-
inal justice. Nevertheless, a proposal such as this presents a number
of challenges. First, it must account for the tremendous force of
history working against the grand jury. Critics have been pessimis-
tic at best about the grand jurys potential to perform any meaning-
ful role in criminal justice.30 Indeed, many critics have called for the
grand jurys abolition altogether.31 Much of this criticism, however,
fails to take into account what role the grand jury has played
throughout history. As the author of this Article has written else-
where:
[T]he grand jury has demonstrated its tremendous potential to
contribute beyond the traditional roles assigned to it today. Even
within the American experience, the grand jury has served as a
pivotal institution in the civic life of communities. For example,
grand juries in colonial America levied taxes, allocated public
works spending, appointed government officials, and helped to
manage other affairs of local government. Only later did the
grand jury begin to be limited to the circumscribed roles it per-
forms today.32
Perhaps the best way to rebut critics condemnation of the grand
jurys usefulness is to put the grand jury to good use, and deploying
the grand jury in the guilty plea process would do just that.
30. See Kuckes, supra note 5, at 2-3.
31. In addition to the longstanding general criticism of the grand jury, recent events in
the United States have caused many to question whether the grand jury should be abolished.
See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Should the American Grand Jury Survive Ferguson?, 58 HOW. L.J.
201, 203 (2015).
32. Fairfax, supra note 17, at 353-54 (footnotes omitted).
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2. Impact on Efficiency of Criminal Justice
Administrative efficiency is necessary in the modern criminal
justice system; without plea bargaining, the system likely would
grind to a halt.33 Thus, any attempt to alter the process and inject
popular participation must prompt consideration of the practical
effect on the administration of criminal justice.
Obviously, such popular participation in the process can frustrate
efficiencya very real concern given the volume of matters on a
typical courts docket.34 However, the requirement of lay participa-
tion represented by the grand jury, and petit jury rights enshrined
in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments as well as in many state consti-
tutions, not only necessarily frustrate efficiency but also vindicate
both the individual rights of the defendant and the institutional
interests of the jury.35
3. Other Concerns
Beyond these two primary concerns, there are other questions to
be answered. Even if these functions can transfer from the judge to
the grand jury and thereby restore popular input, how do lay grand
jurors gain the perspective needed to perform this role? How many
cases must they encounter in order for them to obtain the kind of
perspective we expect judges to have when reviewing plea agree-
ments for fairness or compliance with prevailing norms in a juris-
diction? There are no good answers to these questions other than to
say that, over a broad run of cases, and with their collective wisdom
and experience, grand jurors will hopefully exhibit the kind of per-
spective and judgment we would expect, and their participation will
hopefully be an improvement over a regime in which there is no
popular participation.
Practical considerations remain. If grand jury secrecy is to be
maintained, having the grand jurors participate in the process may
33. See Michelle Alexander, Opinion, Go to Trial: Crash the Justice System, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 11, 2012, at SR5.
34. See As Workloads Rise in Federal Courts, Judge Counts Remain Flat, TRAC REP. (Oct.
14, 2014), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/judge/364/ [https://perma.cc/Y8L8-95AB].
35. See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Harmless Constitutional Error and the Institutional Signifi-
cance of the Jury, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2027, 2060 (2008).
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pose a challenge. For example, the factual basis for a plea is typi-
cally considered in open court with the government representing the
facts that it could prove beyond a reasonable doubt at trial. If the
grand jury were to assess the factual basis for a plea, that assess-
ment would have to take place within the closed confines of the
grand jury in order to protect the identities of the grand jurors.
Furthermore, if grand jurors reject a plea agreement because the
grand jurors are not satisfied that there is a factual basis for the
plea (rather than disapproval of the substantive terms of the plea
agreement), only the prosecutor would know the actual reason why
the plea was rejected. An unscrupulous prosecutor could be less
than forthright with defense counsel about the reason for the grand
jurys rejection of the plea, leading the latter to believe that the
grand jurors are unwilling to approve the plea because the terms of
the agreement were too lenient.
However, these concerns could be addressed in several ways,
including a requirement that the specific basis for the grand jurys
rejection of the guilty plea or plea agreement be communicated in
writing, either to the parties directly or through a judge. Addition-
ally, maintaining the grand jurors secrecy need not drive the entire
plea process from the public courtroom. The court entertaining the
guilty plea can simply note the grand jurys prior approval of the
factual basis as part of the typical open-court plea colloquy. This
approach would make prior grand jury approval of the factual basis
(and the plea agreement itself) a feature of the existing plea process.
Finally, bringing the grand jury into the process would inject
greater scrutiny into the existing plea bargaining regime. As a
general matter, judges entertaining plea agreements are not en-
couraged to delve into the details of the plea agreements.36 To be
sure, judges help to ensure that the plea is knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary,37 that counsel provided adequate assistance,38 and that
the terms of the agreement comport with the judges intended
36. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judges Role in Plea Bargaining, Part I, 76 COLUM.
L. REV. 1059, 1059 (1976) (The general consensus seems to be that trial judges should not
participate in the pretrial negotiations that currently lead the overwhelming majority of
American criminal defendants to plead guilty rather than exercise the right to trial.).
37. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2).
38. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364, 374 (2010).
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disposition.39 However, having the grand jury review the plea agree-
ment would send the message that the fairness of the resulting
guilty plea is being regulated by representatives of the community.
III. JUDGES REACTIONS TO THE PROPOSAL40
I often share my scholarship with criminal law practitioners
prosecutors and defense attorneys, criminal justice administrators,
and reform advocatesupon whom I rely to give me a real-world
perspective. I decided to run this proposal by judges because, ulti-
mately, it would wrest certain responsibilities from the court itself.
Therefore, I conducted informal conversations with a handful of
judges.
These discussions were limited and did not reach the level of a
formal survey. First, there was no methodologically sound survey or
set of questions; I merely presented the proposal to the judges and
had conversations with them, each lasting about thirty minutes.
Second, my sample size was quite small. I engaged with three fed-
eral district court judges and four state judges from six different
jurisdictions across the country. These judges had diverse practice
backgrounds prior to assuming the bench: there was one former civil
litigator, one former criminal defense attorney, one former state
prosecutor and former state judge, and four former federal prose-
cutors. Although two had been judges for twenty years or more,
most were relatively junior, having served for under ten years. One
had served on the United States Sentencing Commission. What I
learned from these judges may have changed my thinking not just
about my proposal, but also about what we need to do more broadly
to regulate plea bargaining.
The judges were almost uniformly skeptical of the ability of the
grand jury (or any type of popular, representative body) to improve
the plea process in any meaningful way. In fact, one judge described
the proposal as an interesting idea but thought that as a practical
matter, grand jury approval of plea agreements in every case would
39. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c).
40. This Part draws from a series of interviews with state, federal, and District of Colum-
bia trial judges concerning the strengths and weaknesses of my proposal. I would like to
thank the judges for their thoughtful and helpful opinions. To preserve the judges anonymity,
I refer to them by pseudonyms in citations.
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be disastrous, given the crushing volume of criminal cases that state
courts currently face.41 The others were not quite as emphatic
about the shortcomings of the proposal, but they did have specific
observations about its likelihood of improving the plea bargaining
process.
A. Factual Basis
With regard to the idea of using the grand jury to determine the
factual basis of guilty pleas, several judges emphasized the negoti-
ated nature of the statement of facts.42 As one judge explained,
many times the plea bargain depends upon, for example, the quan-
tity of contraband or the absence of gun possession.43 Therefore, the
statement of facts can drive not only the counts of conviction but
also sentencing issues and available alternatives to incarceration.
One of these judges expressed uncertainty about what the grand
jury would add to the process, particularly given that they are lay
people without an understanding of the legal issues driving fact
bargaining.44 Nevertheless, as discussed above, the grand jury
could regulate this fact bargaining to ensure that these stipulated
facts are substantiated in some way and that a plea bargain does
not rest completely upon a fiction.45
Another theme that emerged during the interviews was the con-
cern that the prosecutor would be able to influence the grand jury
to endorse whatever factual scenario the government desired to
facilitate the plea. Many of the judges made the familiar argument
that the grand jury is the captive of the prosecutor, and the prose-
cutor would be able to manipulate its review of any factual inquiry,
including the factual basis for a guilty plea.46
The judges were split regarding the grand jurys role vis-à-vis
the courts responsibility to approve the factual basis for the guilty
41. Telephone Interview with Judge A (Feb. 19, 2015) [hereinafter Interview with Judge
A].
42. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Judge B (Feb. 17, 2015) [hereinafter Interview
with Judge B].
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See supra Part II.A.
46. See, e.g., Interview with Judge B, supra note 42; Telephone Interview with Judge C
(Feb. 17, 2015) [hereinafter Inverview with Judge C].
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plea. One judge was of the view that the factual basis needs little
oversight in the first place.47 Under this view, neither the court nor
the grand jury need to review the factual basis for the plea because
the parties reach agreement independently.48 At the other end of
the spectrum, one judge emphasized the courts primacy in the pro-
cess of approving guilty pleas, noting that ultimately, it would be
the courts decision to accept the factual basis, regardless of what
the grand jury does, so the grand jury would be superfluous.49 Of
course, the proposal could prompt a change in the typical rules
requiring the court to accept the factual basis by transferring that
responsibility to the grand jury.50 Even if the court were left the
ultimate responsibility to approve the factual basis for a plea, the
grand jury could still play an advisory role.
Finally, and importantly, one judge noted that she was largely
seeing pleas to charges in the indictment, as opposed to pre-indict-
ment pleas. As this judge noted, [a]lthough probable cause is not
the standard applied in the factual basis determination, [the grand
jurys decision to indict] is probably enough popular participation.
The judge can take it from there.51 This observation underscores a
key rationale for involving the grand jury in the approval of the fac-
tual basis. Although a plea to an indictment necessarily involves the
grand jury that found probable cause for the allegations in the
charging document, a pre-indictment plea involves the waiver of the
indictment and, thus, the removal of the grand jurys participation.52
Using the grand jury to approve the factual basis for a plea would
ensure that the community would participate to some degree in the
disposition of all cases.
47. See Interview with Judge B, supra note 42.
48. See id. (The defendant and the government have to sign off anyway, and if they both
sign off, it is good enough for me.).
49. Interview with Judge C, supra note 46.
50. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3); see also supra Part II.B.
51. Telephone Interview with Judge D (Feb. 11, 2015) [hereinafter Interview with Judge
D].
52. See DOJ, GRAND JURY MANUAL ch. 9, at IX-26 (1st ed. 1991), http://federalevidence.
com/pdf/LitPro/GrandJury/Grand_Jury_Manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/D5KC-3KZ9] (The first
paragraph(s) of a pre-indictment plea agreement ordinarily recites the defendants agreement
to waive indictment.).
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B. Review of the Terms of the Plea Agreement
The judges skepticism of the proposal extended to the ability of
the grand jury to play a meaningful role in reviewing the terms of
the plea agreement. Although some of the judges did acknowledge
that, as argued above, making plea agreements subject to grand
jury review might alter prosecutorial behavior, encouraging them
to be more even-handed in the pleas they offer,53 most expressed
serious reservations regarding the grand jurys proposed oversight
of the terms of plea agreements.
One of the more damning critiques of the proposal is that the
grand jury simply would be out of its depth in reviewing the terms
of plea agreements. A few of the judges emphasized that reviewing
plea agreements for reasonableness does not involve an evidentia-
ry standard, such as probable cause or proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. One judge was unconvinced that the grand jurors have the
perspective necessary to evaluate the reasonableness or fairness of
plea agreements, concluding that [t]here is no compelling reason
to take this from the judge.54 However, at least one judge saw a role
for the grand jury, noting that the trial judge cant engage in plea
negotiations, it could influence sentencing; but perhaps the grand
jury ... could play a role in mediating plea bargaining.55
One judge worried that the proposal impedes not only the discre-
tion of the judge but also the discretion of the parties.56 As with the
factual basis review, the judge thought that giving the grand jury
the power to veto plea agreements would frustrate the considered
preferences of the parties.57 Another judge observed that [p]leas are
entered into for a variety of reasons.58 On the government side,
there might be a problem with witnesses or a lack of resources to
devote to a given case.59 For the defendant, it might simply boil
down to a desire to cut losses60 and avoid both conviction for a
much more serious offense and exposure to a more substantial
53. Interview with Judge D, supra note 51.
54. Id.
55. Interview with Judge C, supra note 46.
56. See Interview with Judge A, supra note 41.
57. See id.
58. Telephone Interview with Judge E (Feb. 18, 2015).
59. See id.
60. Id.
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punishment.61 This judge argued that injecting the grand jury into
this process could frustrate this delicate cost-benefit analysis.62 For
instance, one judge queried: Could a grand jury force a capital
defendant to go to trial?63
C. Practical Concerns
The judges interviewed also raised some practical concerns with
the proposal more generally. One judge was concerned that the pro-
posal would have a disproportionately negative impact on defen-
dants and suggested that the proposal would necessitate opening up
the grand jury process to the participation of defense counsel for the
purpose of avoiding the one-sided presentation of the prosecutor.64
One judge noted that grand jury secrecy might be a problem, as
only the prosecutor would know why the plea agreement was rejec-
ted by the grand jury.65 Unless defense counsel were given a role, or
the grand jury made a statement available to both sides, the grand
jury secrecy rules would need to be changed to ensure fairness to the
parties.66 Another judge encouraged consideration of the impact this
proposal would have on the grand jurors themselves. This judge be-
lieved that it was already difficult to get grand jurors to serve, and
to use the grand jury in this way would thus represent a tremen-
dous increase in workload, which would necessitate many more
grand juries.67
The judges uniformly expressed concern that the proposal does
not adequately account for the challenges facing courts in a world
of austerity.68 Judges cited high caseloads and scarce resources as
key rationales for the ubiquity of plea bargaining.69 The last thing
the proposals for reform should do is impede resolution of cases.70
61. See id.
62. See id. ([Grand jury review] can stop both the defendant and prosecutor from achiev-
ing [their] aims. Grand jurors might actually be more punitive (or lenient) than parties expect,
and can upset settled expectations.).
63. Interview with Judge A, supra note 41.
64. See id.
65. See Interview with Judge D, supra note 51.
66. See id.
67. See Interview with Judge A, supra note 41.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., id.; Interview with Judge B, supra note 42.
70. Interview with Judge A, supra note 41.
1410 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:1395
When asked why judges might be opposed to reforms of the plea
bargaining process, one judge responded that a judges job is to
move cases, consistent with due process, toward a just resolution,
expressing the sentiment that any potential reform would have to
accommodate the realities that not every case can proceed to trial
and that scarce trial resources must be devoted to the resolution of
cases in which the facts are actually in dispute.71 One judge offered
a compromise approach, suggesting that the proposal could be lim-
ited to certain types of cases with heightened public interest in
having lay oversight of plea bargains, such as in civil rights or po-
lice misconduct criminal cases.72
D. The Judges Suggestions for Better Regulating Plea Bargaining
The judges, although generally open to reform of the plea process,
held sincere doubts about the ability of the grand jury to play a role.
One judges question seemed to summarize this commonly-held
view: How do you increase transparency [in the plea process] with-
out adding procedural hurdles and workload and without limiting
the defendants right to bargain?73 Despite crediting the value of
brainstorming and thinking outside the box, many of the judges
expressed the need for tools that make the process even more
efficient, not less efficient. They emphasized that they do not have
the time or bandwidth in the context of busy dockets to adopt
proposals that would harm efficiency in case processing.74
Therefore, I asked each of the judges to tell me what changes they
would make to the plea process if they could wave a magic wand
and have courts, Congress, and state legislatures do their bidding.
One issue a judge raised related to defendants waivers of appeal
rights and FOIA rights under many plea agreements.75 As a result,
very few bargained cases go up on appeal.76 When defendants cede
71. Id.
72. See id.
73. Id.
74. See Telephone Interview with Judge F (Feb. 18, 2015) [hereinafter Interview with
Judge F]. But see Darryl K. Brown, The Perverse Effects of Efficiency in Criminal Process, 100
VA. L. REV. 183, 183 (2014) (arguing that increased efficiency in the criminal justice system
may do more harm than good).
75. See Interview with Judge D, supra note 51.
76. See Nancy J. King & Michael E. ONeill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of Sentencing
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these rights at the plea bargaining stage, they do not yet know what
errors will take place in the application of the sentencing guide-
lines or calculations, but they are powerless to withdraw the plea if
an error occurs.77 The judge opined that the court should have much
greater involvement in regulating these blanket waivers of appel-
late rights.78
On a related note, one judge noted that she has seen an increase
in C pleas as a result of the greater sentencing discretion judges
have in the new regime.79 The judge suggested that perhaps more
of a middle-ground [may be] built into the rules whereby the court
can help shape the plea legitimately, as opposed to in the informal
ways it sometimes happens.80
Another judge stressed the need to address the racial disparities
in plea agreements, citing recent data from a Vera Institute of Jus-
tice study of the New York County District Attorneys Office at the
invitation of District Attorney Cyrus Vance.81 The judge explained
that [j]udges dont have any idea of the terms of plea offers until
very late, if at all, and sometimes have to address injustices
through sentencing, noting a case where two equally culpable defen-
dants were poised to receive disparate sentences because one was
charged with, and tried for, distribution of narcotics while the other
was permitted to plead to possession of paraphernalia.82 The judge
was adamant that [t]here must be a way to rein in prosecutorial
abuses and excesses earlier in the process,83 a sentiment shared by
many of the judges.84
Policy, 55 DUKE L.J. 209, 212 (2005) (noting that in two-thirds of the sample, the defendant
waived the right to appeal, and the government seemed more generous to those who waived).
See generally Nancy J. King, Plea Bargains that Waive Claims of Ineffective Assistance
Waiving Padilla and Frye, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 647 (2013).
77. See Interview with Judge D, supra note 51.
78. See id.
79. Telephone Interview with Judge G (Feb. 17, 2015) [hereinafter Interview with Judge
G]; see FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C).
80. Interview with Judge G, supra note 79.
81. See Interview with Judge C, supra note 46 (referring to BESIKI KUTATELADZE ET AL.,
VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, RACE & PROSECUTION IN MANHATTAN (2014), http://www.vera.org/
sites/default/files/resources/downloads/race-and-prosecution-manhattan-summary.pdf [https://
perma.cc/JFJ7-5T62]).
82. Interview with Judge C, supra note 46.
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., Interview with Judge B, supra note 42.
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One judge suggested that courts should require [the] govern-
ment to give full disclosure of evidence prior to the plea, including
pre-plea discovery depositions of government witnesses in federal
criminal cases.85 Furthermore, with regard to the value of transpar-
ency that might be served by enhancing popular participation in the
plea process, a number of the judges offered alternatives. One judge
stated that [i]f you want more transparency, the grand jury is not
the way to go; perhaps require plea reports containing aggregate
data regarding negotiated dispositions to be made available to the
public by prosecuting agencies.86 Another judge suggested a clear-
inghouse for plea agreements, stating that some neutral party
needs to oversee and guide the negotiations, just not twenty-three
lay people!87
CONCLUSION
Although the proposal generally was not embraced by the experi-
enced judges who provided feedback, the thought experiment was
worthwhile for a number of reasons. First, it highlighted the fact
that the grand jury might be worthy of serious consideration for
utilization in criminal justice reform. Although there are obstacles,
the grand jury represents a rich source of popular engagement in
the criminal justice system at a time when greater transparency
and public confidence are sorely needed.
Furthermore, notwithstanding doubts that the grand jury is prop-
erly equipped to participate in the guilty plea process, the thought
experiment highlighted areas where plea bargainingnow a perma-
nent feature of the modern criminal justice systemis in need of
attention. Greater scrutiny is required of the negotiated factual
agreements that drive sentencing exposure and collateral conse-
quences of conviction and that can ensnare the factually innocent in
guilty pleas of convenience. Another area of concern is the process
by which we ensure that plea agreements are both fair to the parties
and in the public interest.
85. Interview with Judge B, supra note 42.
86. Interview with Judge A, supra note 41.
87. Interview with Judge F, supra note 74.
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Additionally, the judges provided insight on what plea bargaining
reforms they feel are most needed, including regulation of defen-
dant waivers of rights, greater pre-plea disclosure of evidence, and
enhanced transparency around the role of plea bargaining in our
system. All of these and other suggested reforms are proposed in the
shadow of the awesome caseload burdens under which these judges
and their courts labor. In the end, we may be hoping that efficiency
and the desire for popular participation in the criminal justice
system are not mutually exclusive, and that both might flourish.

